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Criminal insanity: 
Conlicting intuitions1 
Jeff Coulter 
Boston University 
Abstract 
This paper’s focus is upon the history, and contemporary use, of the ‘Not Guilty By 
Reason of Insanity’ plea (alternatively known as ‘Not Guilty By Reason of Mental 
Disease Or Defect’ in some jurisdictions) in the Anglo-American criminal justice 
system. In the USA, this plea has a varied geographical distribution, and there have 
been some quite notorious instances of its deployment—I discuss one these in some 
depth: the Andrea Yates case. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this discussion, my aim is to attempt to clarify the concept of ‘criminal insanity’ 
as it currently applies in our society and how it has metamorphosed over the past 
two centuries. I begin with one intuition which is somewhat stark. When Jeffrey 
Dahmer was convicted of serial cannibalistic murders, he was imprisoned rather 
than sent to a mental hospital for the criminally insane. But why? After all, ver-
nacular versions of insanity comprise reactions such as: ‘Whoever did that must 
have been mad/crazy/a psychopath’ and so forth. Many such reactions typiied 
common responses to Dahmer’s atrocities. Also to those of Ted Bundy and John 
 
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented to the ‘Mind and Society Seminar Series’, Manchester 
University, U.K., October 29, 2018, chaired by Professor Wes Sharrock for whom this festschrift has 
been produced. My sincere thanks to Professor David Bruck (personal communication, March 24, 
2013) for his insightful remarks on which I shall draw extensively later in this essay. Professor Bruck 
is Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Virginia Capital Case Clearing House, Washington 
and Lee School of Law, Lexington, Virginia. I am also grateful for his comments on an earlier draft 
of this essay to Professor Dennis Patterson, Law and Philosophy Departments, and Co-Director, 
Institute for Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University School of Law. I am also indebted to Professor 
Paul Jalbert for his editorial help on earlier drafts. Thanks also to my colleague at Boston University, 
Professor Peter Yeager, whose incisive comments on an earlier draft were most helpful. None of these 
colleagues are in any way responsible for whatever use I have made of their kind assistance. 
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Wayne Gacy, all of whom tried and failed to achieve an insanity defense. When 
John Hinckley Jr. attempted to assassinate then-President Reagan, he was found 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. (The main reason for such a verdict was the 
demonstrated obsession Hinckley testiied to with the actress Jodie Foster with 
whom he had corresponded pointlessly: his absurd notion was that such an assas-
sination could impress her and, perhaps, engage her interest in him.)2 These cases 
form the beginning of my inquiries. One arguably inconsistent intuition could be 
as follows: is there such a concept, implicit in the use of the NGRI defense, which 
excludes the heinousness of the crime from the criteria considered in such adjudi-
cations? If so, why is this the case? Is there what we could call a ‘heinousness 
exemption’ in such cases as are defended in NGRI cases? Jurors appear to accept 
such a move in a vast majority of cases. One issue with which I am not concerned, 
but which is often raised when controversies pertaining to this defense are ad-
dressed, is the rarity of the success of any NGRI plea. I am not doing frequency 
studies in this essay. I am only interested in the logic (or, occasionally, the lack 
thereof) of the appeal to insanity as a reason for exculpating a person from having 
committed a crime. One issue which I will not be dealing with is this one: ‘insanity’ 
is a purely legal concept, and not a psychiatric one. I do not think that this dis-
tinction is really signiicant for the forthcoming analysis, but it must be kept in 
focus. 
Let us review the history of the idea that one could be found Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity. (I shall leave for later a consideration of the major alternative, 
which is the idea of a inding of Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI).) 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NGRI PLEA 
Deriving from the Roman legal distinction between actions undertaken in mens 
rea and those non compos mentis (roughly, ‘not of sound mind’), the development 
of Western juridical conceptions of the exemption from responsibility (and thence 
culpability) even for serious crimes can be dated in Western jurisprudence from 
the Hadield case (1800).3 His crime was to have attempted to assassinate King 
George III. On the evening of May 15th 1800 at the Theatre Royal in Drury Lane, 
during the playing of the national anthem, James Hadield ired a pistol at the 
King, but missed. He was tried for high treason and was defended by the leading 
barrister of the day, Thomas Erskine. Hadield pleaded insanity, but the prevailing 
standard for a successful plea was that the defendant must be ‘lost to all sense … 
incapable of forming a judgement upon the consequences of the act which he is 
about to do’. Hadield’s planning of the (attempted) assassination appeared to 
 
2 For a complete account of this case and trial, see Low et al (1986). 
3 For an excellent exegesis of this case, and of others which followed, see Robinson (1980, chapter 
2). 
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contradict such a claim. Erskine’s strategy was to mount a challenge to the insanity 
criterion, contending that a delusion alone, with no ‘frenzy or raving madness’, 
was the fundamental sign of insanity. The judge, Lloyd Kenyon, halted the trial 
and declared that the verdict was essentially an acquittal, but that the prisoner 
must not be simply discharged. Defendants acquitted by reason of insanity faced 
no speciic fate and were often released to their families. Due to the public outrage 
attending this decision (because of the fear that a released felon might be a threat 
to innocent people) Parliament rapidly passed the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800 to 
provide for the indeinite detention of insane defendants. Hadield was detained 
in Bethlem Royal Hospital (or ‘Bedlam’, as it was notoriously known) for the rest 
of his life (except for a brief period when he had managed to escape). He died 
there from tuberculosis in 1841.4 
Hadield had been convinced by a Bannister Truelock (later also hospitalized) 
that the Savior‘s Second Coming was imminent, but that the King’s conduct stood 
in the way of Redemption. In Robinson’s (1980) poignant account of this partic-
ular crime, the idea that a guilty party did not know ‘right from wrong’ is some-
what compromised—to whit: Hadield believed that it would be right to kill the 
King, and wrong to allow him to deliver Britain into the hands of Satan. The plea 
was predicated on the claim that the criminal act was based on a delusion. This 
very early case involved the notion that for a successful defense case to move for-
ward, the plea must assert that ‘the defendant must be lost to all senses … incapa-
ble of forming a judgment upon the consequences of the act he was about to do’. 
The next major case was the famous M’Naghten trial. Daniel McNaughten 
(usually transcribed as M’Naghten in the legal history of this case) was an itinerant 
woodcutter who shot and killed Edward Diamond, the secretary to the Prime Min-
ister, by mistake (he was aiming at the Prime Minister but missed his intended 
target).5 
M’Naghten falsely believed that he was being persecuted by the government of 
the day, but no evidence was found to sustain his claim, hence he was construed 
as suffering from a delusion of an unusual sort. In 1843 the Law Lords formulated 
the M’Naghten Rules. There have to be demonstrably present: (1) A defect of rea-
son, (2) This must have been produced by a ‘disease of the mind’ and (3) The result 
must have been that the accused did not know the nature of his act or that it was 
illegal.6 This case essentially formed the foundation for the criminal insanity pre-
cept both in the UK and the USA. Here are its details.7 
In the reign of Edward 1 in England, this famous case resulted in the following 
judicial decision: 
 
4 See Moran (1985) and Eigen (1995). 
5 For a complete account of this landmark case, see West and Walk (1977). Also see Smith (1981). 
6 This outline was culled from Hart (1968: 189). 
7 In this I am drawing upon the classic work of Fingarette (1972) and also the superb chapter, ‘Mental 
Disorder and the Law’ in Cockerham (2010, chapter 14). See also White (2017). 
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… that to establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proved 
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
doing what was wrong. (Cockerham 2010: 311–12) 
The temporality provision was later to prove an obstacle to the implementation 
of the Rule: how could one assess the state of mind of a defendant at the exact 
time of the crime he or she committed? The psychiatric community weighed in, 
arguing that the generic idea of Roman Law, i.e. the concept of furiosus (later that 
of a ‘berserk’ person) ought not to preclude an appeal to a timeline. After all, it 
had long been established psychiatric doctrine that insanity could exhibit sympto-
matological discontinuities. But this doctrine begged the question of how to assess 
their symptoms’ presence or absence in any reliable way. In 1954 the generic ap-
peal to the M’Naghten provision in the United States was superseded by the 
Durham Rule. This allowed the psychiatric profession great sway in courts of law 
dealing with NGRI pleas, in which the issue of ixing temporality was set aside, 
but one year later the American Law Institute advanced an alternative to Durham 
in the United States Criminal Court: their Model Penal Code enunciated the fol-
lowing conception: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law. As used in this Article, the terms ‘mental disease or 
defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated or otherwise 
antisocial conduct. (Cockerham 2010: 313) 
However, this Rule reintroduced the relevance of the temporality of the act, 
and thus also the temporality of the state of mind of the accused. In the United 
States today, three states refuse to allow an NGRI plea: Montana, Idaho and Utah. 
The arguments which appear to have persuaded their legislatures are unclear to 
me, but surely the standard conception of this plea as it is now practiced in many 
jurisdictions has involved a continuous controversy. 
Kevin Davis, in a recent study, notes that: 
In the latter half of the eighteenth century… one hundred recorded pleas of insanity 
were entered at the Old Bailey, London’s Central Criminal Court. Of them, sixty 
resulted in acquittals, a success rate more than double that of today, in which 15 to 
25 percent of such cases lead to a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. An 
acquittal at the Old Bailey meant the defendant could go free without any conine-
ment to a mental institution or asylum, a policy that created public resentment and 
fear. However, if the person was considered too dangerous, the court could convene 
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a separate civil hearing to determine whether he or she should be held at a lunatic 
asylum. There was no consistency in how these cases were handled. In most in-
stances, the insane were sent home. Others were placed under the care and protec-
tion of friends or relatives. A handful were conined to asylums … (Davis 2017: 43, 
emphasis added) 
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
A preferred alternative to the NGRI plea has been adopted now in 20 states. It is 
referred to as the ‘Guilty But Mentally Ill’ plea. This alternative originated with 
the trial of Ralph Tortorici, whose guilt was clear but who was, for all everyday, 
vernacular intents and purposes, obviously insane. It is contested by many because 
it appears to be an oxymoron. If you are insane by psychiatric standards such that 
you have no capacity to understand what you are doing when you commit a crime, 
then the concept of responsibility is nulliied and thence also the idea of guilt (ac-
cording to the precept of mens rea). A defendant who received a GBMI verdict is 
routinely sentenced like a commonly compos mentis criminal defendant. By 1995, 
twenty states embraced the American Law Institute (ALI) Rule, twenty-eight states 
the M’Naghten Rule, and one state (New Hampshire) the Durham Rule. In 1984, 
Congress, acting upon the negative public reception in the United States to the 
acquittal of the would-be assassin of President Reagan, John Hinckley Jr., passed 
the Insanity Defense Reform Act according to which the burden in Federal law is 
shifted from the prosecution to the defendant to prove insanity at the time of the 
criminal act (Cockerham 2010: 313-314). (Only twelve states retained the prior 
provision in law which asserted that the burden falls to the state.) Until 1972, 
defendants who were thought to be incompetent to stand trial were hospitalized 
for an indeinite period. In the same year, the Supreme Court decided that such 
open-ended institutionalization was unconstitutional.  
Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned issues, there are other considerations to 
handle. One provision of the insanity defense in the United States allowed the 
concept of ‘irresistible impulse’ to apply. In the U.K., Lord Atkin’s Committee rec-
ommended in 1923 that such a provision ought to apply as an amendment to the 
M’Naghten Rule. This provision was rejected, and it was not until 1957 that a 
plea of ‘diminished responsibility’ was allowed into the legal calculus of pleas. 
However, as H.L.A. Hart (1968) has noted, some judges (e.g., in the case of Lord 
Goddard in R. v. Spriggs 1958) refused to direct juries to consider the accused’s 
capacity to conform to the law, rather than simply his or her knowledge of it. 
Cartographic and historical variations in the treatment of ‘criminal insanity’ 
are almost notorious. There is a patchwork quilt with holes in it applying to this 
issue across the Western world. Almost no standardization has been accomplished 
in its deployment, and it is a rare case, as noted earlier, in which such a plea, where 
even permissible, actually wins a case. 
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Richard Arens’s study of the application of the Durham Rule in D.C. jurisdic-
tions had this to say: 
The testimony of experts on organic conditions is usually treated with deference; or 
at least with greater respect than testimony about ‘functional’ mental diseases. Lay 
jurors, judges and counselors at law are reluctant to believe that a person who is 
entirely aware that he is doing wrong is nevertheless driven to perform a forbidden 
act as a result of conlicting drives of whose nature he is unaware. (Arens 1969: 
112)8 
One exception was the case against Lorena Bobbitt, who was acquitted of crim-
inal charges against her husband after having cut off his penis. The verdict in her 
case was ‘temporary insanity’. An interesting feature of this case is the following: 
‘A jury concluded that she had yielded to an irresistible impulse after having been 
raped by her husband. Before that event, Mrs. Bobbitt had allegedly suffered con-
tinued physical and psychological abuse from her spouse’ (Cockerham 2010: 312). 
Professor Bruck informed me (personal communication) that judges are not 
required to explain to jurors the exact nature of the insanity plea: ‘The result is a 
legal system that almost guarantees that jurors will reject even the most valid in-
sanity defense out of a misplaced fear of putting a violent person back on the 
street’. There is evidence that jurors are not well-informed about the conditions 
for a inding of NGRI. Expert testimony is over-rated as a decisive component in 
cases involving an insanity plea: most jurors prefer to apply their own ‘com-
monsense’ and values to such cases. There is always a risk here, and jurors under-
stand that: ‘dangerousness’ is a far more compelling issue than mens rea (Cocker-
ham 2010). Since psychiatrists can be called upon to testify for both the prosecu-
tion and the defense, jurors are required de facto to use their own best judgment.  
There have been efforts to simulate insanity in courts of law: they rarely work. 
We know that some folks who have been homeless and destitute have tried to get 
into a mental hospital in order to have a few meals and a roof over their heads 
(Braginsky et al. 1969).9 And then of course we have to deal with issues of neuro-
physiology (Bennett and Hacker 2011).10 The burden of sustaining the idea of 
expert testimony often relies upon the demonstrability of the scientiicity of their 
testimony. So, we confront a major question here: Is psychiatry a genuine science 
even when it does not (or cannot) present compelling biological/neurophysiologi-
cal evidence to buttress its claims to scientiic expertise? 
 
8 For a contrasting view, see Perlin (2017). 
9 On the other hand we have the well-known work of David Rosenhan (1973). All of these studies 
make it an issue for how anyone accused might simulate insanity. 
10 Stephen J. Morse (2016: 273) in a trail-blazing article, writes: ‘Neuroscience will not justiiably 
revolutionise legal insanity or criminal responsibility doctrines and practices in the short term and 
is unlikely to do so in the intermediate term’. 
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Here I draw upon a paper by Anthony Kenny, ‘The Psychiatric Expert In Court’ 
(1984). Kenny makes several arguments which I would like to consider here. His 
focus is upon the issue of the nature of science, and especially as it may (or may 
not) apply to the human sciences. Is psychiatry a ‘human science’? Of course, in 
some respects, it purports to be, and a major component of psychiatry as practiced 
today includes the application of medical techniques and pharmaceutical treat-
ment regimes, often prescribed without necessarily having to name the condition 
to which such medications have been allocated. For example, I have witnessed the 
prescription of psychotropic drugs (most especially Olanzapene, trade-name 
Zyprexa—one of the most effective psychopharmacological treatments ever de-
vised since the early days of Chlorpromazine (Largactyl, etc.) to persons whose 
only diagnosis has been that of ‘Psychosis’. It seems that the concept of ‘schizo-
phrenia’ and its various subtypes are no longer required for contemporary psychi-
atrists to justify making their medical recommendations. Perhaps this is an ad-
vance, since, as I and many others have argued elsewhere (e.g., Coulter 1991), the 
concept of ‘schizophrenia’, being a polymorph with dubious utility in discerning 
etiological connections, is best retired within the vocabulary of modern thought. 
‘ROUTINE’ MENTAL DISORDERS AND 
THOSE INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
There is a dictum in contemporary psychiatry that ‘schizophrenics’ are over-
whelmingly ‘peaceful’: it is a rarity when a person with this psychiatric diagnosis 
engages in signiicant, violent criminality. Those whose defense involved an NGRI 
plea must often face intensive court scrutiny, wherein psychiatric testimony is usu-
ally deferred to. Facing incarceration in a high security psychiatric facility, such as 
Broadmorr Hospital, located in Crowthrone, England, or Bridgewater State Hos-
pital (a medium security facility) in Massachusetts, a facility portrayed or parodied 
in the documentary made by a Boston-based lawyer Fred Wiseman entitled ‘Titicut 
Follies’ (1967), defendants face a very tough choice indeed, and their defense at-
torneys can be hamstrung by virtue of the publicity attending such a documentary. 
One of the reasons why I, as a professional sociologist, was denied access to the 
Bridgewater State Hospital when I applied to visit that facility in order to engage 
in a ield-work study in that institution was almost certainly the negative publicity 
which the Wiseman ilm generated. I reserve judgment about whether or not that 
documentary accurately portrayed that facility. 
THE HEINOUSNESSS EXEMPTION RE-VISITED: 
THE CASE OF ANDREA YATES 
The case of Andrea Yates is often invoked as an example of a truly heinous crime: 
she drowned her ive children in their bathtub on June 20th 2001, and faced the 
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death penalty. After a guilty verdict was established in her case, the State aban-
doned the request for the death penalty and consigned to her a secure psychiatric 
facility. A basis for this reversal is revealed in an interview with Yates conducted 
by Dr. Park Dietz (hence PD), video clips from which were shown in open court, 
a transcribed section of which I reproduce here: 
PD:  What can you remember about any planning? 
AY:  About drowning them. 
PD:  What were you thinking? 
AY:  What was I thinking? Why to do it? 
PD:  Yes. 
AY:  Because I didnÕt want them tormented by Satan like I was. 
PD:  Was Satan tormenting you then? 
AY:  Yes, I believe so. 
PD:  In what way? 
AY:  Just the thoughts. Bad thoughts. 
PD:  Tell me as much about those thoughts as you can. 
AY:  There was the thoughts about the TVs, and cameras in the house, 
     and afraid Satan would ruin my children through himself, and that 
     maybe I had some Satan in me. 
PD:  How did you think that happened? 
AY:  Satan? 
PD:  Yes. 
AY:  Just the way I behaved. 
PD:  Now did anyone tell you that you had some Satan in you? 
AY:  No. 
PD:  But you saw some clues? 
AY:  I just felt like he was inside giving me directions. 
PD:  What directions? 
AY:  About harming the children. 
PD:  How did he give you directions? 
AY:  Well, eventually I thought of a way out. To drown them. 
PD:  And how would that be a way out? 
AY:  A way out? 
PD:  How would that be a way out? 
AY:  For the children? 
PD:  Yes. 
AY:  They would go to heaven and be safe up there. 
This revealing interview was grist to the mill in court: it appeared that Andrea 
Yates was suffering from religiously-based delusions. Following the birth of her 
fourth child, Rusty (her husband) found her shaking and attempting suicide. Soon 
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after her release, she begged Rusty Yates to let her die as she held a knife to her 
neck. Again, she was hospitalized. 
Andrea Yates was imprisoned after the irst trial. This outcome meets my stand-
ard of a heinousness exemption from an NGRI verdict—jurors wish to punish, 
not to ‘rehabilitate’ (if they actually believe that being hospitalized in a psychiatric 
facility is about ‘rehabilitating’ anyone). The idea, widely shared, is that people 
who commit heinous crimes must face prison time, and what could be more hei-
nous than slaughtering your kids? Such people ought to be locked up … or worse 
… On an appeal of her conviction, she was eventually remanded to a psychiatric 
facility. In this brief study, I venture no opinion on this particular case. My idea 
here is only to assert that an NGRI verdict is an option whereby jurors do not 
decide cases on the basis of psychiatric testimony, but on the basis of their lay 
judgment of proper punishment. I think that this pattern of reasoning is clear 
through the Dahmer, Gacy and Bundy cases mentioned earlier.  
Let us also recall the case of Charles Manson and his ‘family’ of murderers. 
Manson claimed that, by the murders he supervised, he could generate a ‘race war’. 
The white race could then triumph. Manson was convicted of murder—but wasn’t 
he insane to tout the beliefs that he had? Vincent Bugliosi was the trial attorney 
and denied any attempt at an NGRI plea. Why? Because of the heinousness of 
Manson’s crimes. Manson was imprisoned, and not sent to an institution for the 
mentally ill. However, by most ordinary standards, he seemed to be utterly delu-
sional. You want to start a race war by murdering innocent people and then blame 
black folks? Really? Helter Skelter is now a rallying cry for some racists in Amer-
ica. Are they insane by the standards of the legal system, or merely expressing 
disgusting opinions protected by the First Amendment? An interesting discussion, 
to be pursued elsewhere. 
In concluding this discussion, I would like to enter a caveat to Kenny’s (1984) 
otherwise commendable treatment of this issue. It is this: in claiming that lay ju-
rors ought to be accorded primacy in adjudicating cases in which an NGRI case 
has been presented, he sees no way in which psychiatric testimony ought to be 
allocated the role of ‘expert’ testimony, except to enter claims about such matters 
as ‘itness to plead’. If I am not mistaken here, this seems to me to obviate the role 
of the psychiatrist in assessing the nature and state of the use of psychotropic 
medications with their side-effects in criminal cases, in assessing the presence or 
absence of a psychiatrically-relevant neurological anomaly in such cases, and in 
(perhaps prematurely) ruling out the possibility of further advances in our under-
standing of malignant delusions for which, at the moment, we have no clear bio-
logical/biochemical explanations. Delimiting the role of professional psychiatry in 
courts of law, I have argued, is an important objective within our criminal justice 
system. Nonetheless, this does not mean that psychiatrists ought to have no role. 
The key issue before us is: what exactly ought that role to be? One major thesis 
of this paper is: no role which ought to be permitted to take primacy over the 
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inality of jurors’ verdicts. Any discernible neuropathy (a lesion or other anomaly) 
does not amount to a nulliication of the demonstrably criminal character of the 
act or actions being adjudicated in a court of law. There are no cases, to the best 
of my knowledge, where a neural pathology alone can lead to an NGRI verdict, 
because it has never been demonstrated that a neural lesion (or other such anom-
aly) has been speciically related, determinately, to the commission of a major fel-
ony.11 
On a closely related matter, there is the issue of forcible medication of those 
housed in mental hospitals for the criminally insane. The history of psychotropic 
medications is not exactly exemplary. Leon Eisenberg (1973) published a signii-
cant paper in the Scientiic American. In this paper, Eisenberg discussed the history 
of psychotropic medications. One of the earliest was the development of the drug, 
chlorpromazine, developed by Henri Laborit along with his co-worker Pierre 
Deniker. Laborit was a surgeon who serendipitously discovered that chlorproma-
zine (utilized in hibernation surgery, which he practised routinely) could have a 
side-effect of suppressing symptoms of ‘schizophrenia’ such as delusions. Follow-
ing this discovery, with Laborit’s approval, pharmaceutical companies began to 
develop other related psychopharmacological drugs such as Stelazine, Thorazine 
and others which eventually became grouped under the trade-name, Phenothia-
zines. One problem recurred, however, which was the incidence of what became 
known as ‘tardive dyskinesia’, a condition vernacularly referred to a ‘tonguing’, 
whereby the patient experienced involuntary tongue movements beyond his/her 
control. Later, it was discovered that ‘dystonia’, an involuntary foot-shaking 
movement, also occurred. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Pardo and Patterson noted that: 
The M’Naghten test, which focuses on a defendant’s cognitive capacities, depends 
on whether a defendant ‘was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act, etc. 
 
11 According to Davis (1995, chapter 10), the efforts of Adrian Raine and Monte Buchsbaum, two 
biologically-oriented researchers, to specify (largely through positron emission tomography scans) 
one or more speciic neuropathologies in persons being defended by an NGRI plea, led them to 
conclude that a neural anomaly might, at best, predispose someone to behave in an irrationally 
violent manner. However, they further argued that other, unspeciied (presumably ‘environmental’) 
factors can enhance or diminish any such predisposition. Thus, in effect, their ‘indings’ could not be 
appealed to in exonerating a criminal defendant, since everything someone does is a complex func-
tion of their biology and their socialization. No-one has succeeded in adequately partitioning such 
a presumed function; consequently, no concrete deduction relevant to an NGRI plea is available to 
this day. 
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However, these authors add the following: 
Jurisdictions differ as to what they require in order to satisfy either prong of this 
test—for example, does ‘wrong’ mean ‘legally wrong’ or ‘morally wrong’, and if the 
latter, what does ‘moral’ mean?—and whether to include both prongs … . Under 
both types of tests, jurisdictions also differ substantially in how they structure the 
burden of proof. (Pardo and Patterson 2013: 141) 
An interesting question is: how many successful NGRI’s are there in the United 
States? H.R. Steadman (1985) conducted a study and found that in 1978 across 
the country, there were 1554 persons admitted as not guilty by reason of insanity. 
It is a rare verdict, given the enormous number of other-than-NGRI cases which 
confront jurors in this country, but in certain cases, jurors who have been ques-
tioned after trials when an NGRI plea has been entered, often say that, as long as 
those who are convicted thereby are dispatched to a secure psychiatric facility, 
they are content with such a verdict. 
There are various considerations involved in adjudicating NGRI/GBMI ver-
dicts in courts in the United States. Some may strike you as trivial, some far more 
serious. Some politicians think that NGRI/GBMI verdicts permit felons to escape 
from justice (i.e., rightful punishment). My own view is that psychiatric testimony 
in courts of law should be restricted to issues of organic pathology. If this sounds 
too restrictive to you, well consider this—in a court of law, both the defense and 
prosecution can employ psychiatrists to assist their clients. 
There is no doubt that psychiatric medications were often forcibly adminis-
tered, but now we have a major anti-psychotic medication called Xyprexa 
(Olanzapene). It is no panacea, but it far surpasses earlier efforts to handle psy-
choses with medications. Accordingly, issues pertaining to the nature of, treatment 
of, and punishment for, cases adjudicated in courts of law in regard to ‘criminal 
insanity’ are still largely unsettled to date, both in the so-called ‘court of public 
opinion’ as well as in ‘courts of law’. Such is the predicament we as a public must 
confront if ever called upon to assess such cases, as jurors, which are defended 
with a plea of ‘Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity’ or of: ‘Guilty But Mentally Ill’ 
by defense attorneys in the United States. This debate is far from having been set-
tled. 
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